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THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF LOCAL
IMMIGRATION REGULATION:
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Huyen Pham* & Pham Hoang Van**
ABSTRACT
A wave of local anti-immigration laws has swept the country,
triggering contentious debate and raising significant legal and policy
issues. One critical dimension that has been largely ignored, however,
is the economic impact of these laws: Are jurisdictions with them better
off economically than those without them?
In the first empirical study of this issue, we analyze the economic
impact of local anti-immigration laws. The laws take different forms-
some authorize local police to enforce federal immigration laws, some
restrict benefits like housing and employment to those with legal
immigration status, and some require all government transactions to be
conducted in English only. Applying statistical analysis to economic
data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we find that such laws resulted in a
1 to 2% drop in employment, or 337 to 675 lost jobs for the average
county, with payroll dropping between 0.8 and 1.9%. This drop in
employment includes both authorized and unauthorized workers. We
also find that the laws hurt some industries, such as the restaurant
industry, while helping others, such as the grocery and liquor store
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industry. This suggests that affected workers may be switching jobs,
rather than leaving a particular jurisdiction altogether.
Because local immigration regulation has such a profound policy
impact, local governments considering the efficacy of these laws need to
base their decisions on empirical evidence-not assumptions-about the
laws' effects. This Article provides crucial information for that decision
making.
INTRODUCTION
The rise of subfederal immigration regulation is one of the most
significant trends in modem immigration law. In increasing numbers,
states, cities and counties have enacted laws that negatively affect
immigrants within their jurisdictions. These laws have taken three basic
forms: agreements for state and local police to enforce federal
immigration laws; restrictions on benefits like housing and employment
unless applicants can prove legal immigration status; and laws requiring
that all government transactions be conducted only in English.I
The significance of subfederal regulation can be seen in the
sweeping impact it has made on the immigration landscape. From a
legal perspective, subfederal regulation has raised important, complex
questions about the nature of the immigration power. The Supreme
Court has established that only the federal government may establish an
immigration regulation, "essentially a determination of who should or
should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which
a legal entrant may remain." 2 But short of that, what immigration-
related authority may state and local governments exercise as part of
their broad police powers, and what authority belongs exclusively to the
federal government? The lack of legal clarity has entangled many
subfederal immigration laws in litigation and has inspired much
thoughtful analysis. 3
I See infra Part II for detailed information on these laws.
2 De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976) (upholding a state statute that fined employers
who knowingly hired undocumented workers). The statute at issue in De Canas would be
expressly preempted by the federal employer sanctions program enacted in the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006) (stating that federal
employer sanctions preempt state and local employer sanctions, other than licensing laws).
3 See, e.g., Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances:
Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27 (opining
that though subfederal laws aimed at regulating general immigration functions are
constitutionally preempted, there should be an exception carved out for subfederal laws that
govern only subfederal interests and do not trigger federal preemption powers); Cristina M.
Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567
(2008) (arguing that because state and local governments are responsible for the integration of
immigrants, they should have a significant role in immigration regulation); Michael J. Wishnie,
State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1091-95
(2004) (contesting the proposition that state and local police have inherent authority to enforce
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Beyond legal issues, subfederal immigration laws also have
significant policy implications. Numerous claims about their impact
have been made, focusing on whether the laws affect the behavior and
movement of undocumented immigrants. Advocates claim that
vigorous subfederal regulation will force undocumented immigrants to
leave the local jurisdiction, if not the United States entirely. By
enlisting the assistance of state and local governments, the resources
available for immigration enforcement are multiplied; more
enforcement will, in turn, cause undocumented immigrants to "self-
deport."4
Opponents argue that subfederal immigration laws have very little
effect on the movement of undocumented immigrants; because these
immigrants are here to work, they respond to the availability of jobs and
not to other factors like increased enforcement of immigration laws.
From this perspective, subfederal immigration laws only serve to harm
rights: the rights of undocumented immigrants who will be more
reluctant to report crimes to local police and the rights of those
identified as immigrants, who will experience more racial profiling as a
result of the laws.5
One crucial dimension that has been largely left out of the policy
debate is the economic impact of the laws. Economic analysis is
necessarily concerned with the laws' effect on undocumented
immigrants' behavior and movement, but implicates other factors as
well. Are jobs being lost or gained as a result of the laws, and if so, in
what quantity? What kinds of jobs are affected and in what industries?
Who is losing or gaining those jobs, and are there patterns based on
immigration status? In sum, are jurisdictions with these restrictive laws
doing economically better, worse, or the same as jurisdictions without
the laws? Local government officials and their constituents should want
to know the answers to these questions when considering the efficacy of
civil immigration laws, beyond the authority specifically granted by Congress). For more on the
legal debate, see Part I.A.
4 See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach To Illegal
Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 155, 157 (2008) (arguing that increased enforcement
of employer sanctions and increased government enforcement of immigration laws would cause
undocumented immigrants to self-deport); Encouraged Reverse Migration: A Sensible Seven-Step
Strategy for Promoting the Outbound Flow of Illegal Immigration, FED'N FOR AM. IMMIGR.
REFORM (2006), http://www.fairus.org/site/DocServer/research backgrounder may102006.pdf?
doclD=981 [hereinafter Encouraged Reverse Migration] (arguing that increased worksite
enforcement and the elimination of state and local benefits, combined with current deportation
efforts and other enforcement, will "cause the attrition (self-deportation) of the majority of those
here illegally and greatly restrict the inbound illegal flow").
5 See, e.g., David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and Immigration
Enforcement: A Curious Tale of Police Enforcement in Post-9/11 America, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 7-
8 (2006) (suggesting that the reluctance of local police to enforce immigration laws stems from an




these laws in deciding whether to keep laws already on the books and
whether to enact proposed laws.
In this Article, we take up the question of economic impact. We
focus our analysis on local immigration legislation-laws enacted by
cities and counties that negatively affect immigrants within their
jurisdictions. Using a variety of sources, we compiled a list of local
jurisdictions that have enacted restrictive immigration laws, coded by
year of enactment and type of law (police enforcement, government
benefits, housing, employment, or language). We looked specifically at
high-immigrant industries-industries that have traditionally hired large
numbers of undocumented workers-and compared the economic
indicators of these industries located in restrictive jurisdictions with
similar industries located in non-restrictive jurisdictions. We ran these
regressions using government-collected data from the County Business
Patterns (CBP) data set. 6 In order to focus on the effect of the laws, we
used a unique statistical method called difference-in-difference
estimation that allowed us to control for and subtract out the effects of
macro-trends like economic recessions.7
Our results indicate that the restrictive laws had a negative but
small economic effect on the jurisdictions in which they were enacted.
Specifically, we find that these laws had a 1 to 2% negative effect on
employment; for the average U.S. county, this translates to about 337 to
675 jobs (40 to 80 jobs for the median county). Consistent with the
effect on employment, payroll was also negatively affected.8
What do these results mean? Contrary to claims made by
opponents of these laws, our analysis shows that the laws are having an
economic impact on the jurisdictions that enact them. However, in
contrast to claims made by the laws' advocates, the economic impact is
negative and small. Moreover, it should be emphasized that these
results are not evidence that the laws are forcing undocumented
immigrants to leave particular jurisdictions. Our data does not track
immigration status or the movement of those who are losing jobs as a
result of the restrictive laws. We believe that at least some of those
losing jobs are undocumented immigrants, but job loss is likely
affecting documented workers as well. And our industry-specific data
suggesting that workers may be moving among high-immigrant industry
jobs could indicate that affected workers are switching jobs, rather than
leaving a particular jurisdiction altogether.
6 The CBP is economic data collected from employers, broken down by industry and
geographical location. County Business Patterns: Introduction, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/intro.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
7 For more on our methodology, see Part II.
8 For more on our results, see Part III.
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In conducting this analysis, it is our goal to shed light on the effect
of restrictive local immigration laws. The policy debate on these laws
has been particularly fierce, fueled in large part by uncertainty about the
laws' impact. For local governments that have enacted these laws or are
considering adopting similar laws, it is crucial that they understand the
effect that the laws are having. Negative economic impact may or may
not be what local governments want when they enact these restrictive
laws. In times of economic recession, cities and counties may be
interested in more economic activity, not less. And even if negative
economic impact is an acceptable outcome, local governments should
know the small scale on which it is occurring and balance that impact
against the costs of local immigration enforcement.
I. LOCAL IMMIGRATION REGULATION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
In recent years, the question of who enforces our immigration laws
has become as significant as what the substance of those laws is.
Increasing numbers of cities, counties, and states have become involved
in the immigration debate, enacting laws that authorize them to enforce
both federal immigration laws and their own laws affecting immigrants
within their jurisdictions. For reasons explained in Part II, we focus our
empirical analysis on regulation by cities and counties ("local
regulation"), but the observations we offer here also apply to the larger
trend of subfederal immigration regulation.
As explained in more detail below, these subfederal laws have had
a significant legal and policy impact. The impact stems, in part, from
the relative newness of the phenomena. This is not to say that
subfederal governments have had no role in the regulation and
enforcement of immigration laws. We have seen instances, both recent
and historical, where subfederal governments have become involved in
immigration regulation, either by enacting their own laws or by
enforcing federal laws. 9
9 For example, Professor Gerald Neuman argues convincingly that from 1776-1875, the
movement of people across our nation's borders was primarily regulated by state laws,
supplemented by federal laws. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration
Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (1993). Even after 1875, when the federal
government first enacted restrictive immigration legislation and placed federal controls on
immigration, we still see state governments occasionally inserting themselves into the
immigration debate, enacting laws that negatively affect immigrants within their jurisdiction.
Some prominent examples in the post-federalization period include Texas' unsuccessful attempt
to deny K-12 education to undocumented immigrant children, see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982), California's law (upheld by the Supreme Court) to penalize employers who hire
undocumented workers, see De Canas v. Bica, 421 U.S. 907 (1975), and Pennsylvania's law
(struck down by the Supreme Court in a unanimous decision) that restricted state welfare benefits
to U.S. citizens, see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). For a historical overview of
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But the regulations studied here (from 2005 to the present) are
unique for several reasons. First, we see a remarkable level of
involvement from cities and counties-rather than just states-in
subfederal regulation. City councils and county commissions have
taken up the issue of immigration regulation and have carved out a role
for themselves in this policy debate, enacting laws that reach many
different areas of governance.10 As described in more detail in Part III,
local governments enacted only two restrictive immigration regulations
in 2005 but greatly increased the number of enacted laws in subsequent
years (50 in 2006 and 55 in 2007)."
Second, the local immigration regulations that we analyze are
being undertaken with an unprecedented level of federal support and
cooperation. In 2002, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued an
invitation to state and local police, asking them to help enforce
immigration laws.12 Under the direction of Attorney General John
Ashcroft, this invitation reversed previous DOJ legal positions and
opined that state and local governments have "inherent authority" to
enforce both civil and criminal immigration laws.' 3 In tandem with this
legal position, the federal government has put substantial resources into
partnering with subfederal police departments, largely through the
signing of 287(g) agreements that authorize local and state police to
enforce various aspects of federal immigration laws.14 Though express
federal support has been limited to police enforcement laws, the fact
that the federal government is supporting any local role at all has
changed the tenor of the subfederal immigration debate.
American immigration policy (including this post-1875 period), see CHARLES GORDON,
STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, 1 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 2.02-
2.04 (2004).
10 Professor Rick Su suggests that local immigration laws are less a response to immigration
problems and more a natural byproduct of traditional localist debates about community character,
the cost of services like education and crime control, and economic and demographic changes in
the community. See Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L.
REv. 1619,1624 (2008).
11 See infra Figure 1.
12 John Ashcroft, U.S. Att'y Gen., Prepared Remarks on the National Security Entry-Exit
Registration System (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/
speeches/2002/060502agpreparedremarks.htm.
13 Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of Justice to Omar Jadwat, ACLU Immigrant Right's
Project (July 22, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf
(transmitting a redacted memo from the DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel that opines on the
authority of subfederal governments to enforce immigration laws).
14 The term "287(g)" is taken from the numbered provision in the Immigration and
Nationality Act that authorizes the federal-subfederat agreements. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
Under these agreements, DOJ provides training to local and state police officers; it is, however,
the responsibility of the subfederal police departments to pay these officers, both during training




This new trend of local immigration regulation has had a
significant legal and policy impact. Legally, these laws have raised
complex questions about the nature of the immigration power.15 Since
the federal government's enactment of restrictive immigration laws in
1875, the Supreme Court has emphasized the exclusively federal nature
of this power. In upholding the infamous Chinese exclusion laws, the
Court characterized the immigration power as belonging exclusively to
the federal government, a power "incapable of transfer to any other
parties."l 6 The federal nature of this power means that subfederal
governments may not set terms for entry into and exit from the United
States; less obviously, it also prohibits subfederal governments from
restricting the conditions under which immigrants live in this country, if
those conditions contravene federal policy. 17
However, the Supreme Court has given more leeway to subfederal
governments when it comes to their regulation of undocumented
immigrants. Because subfederal governments have such broad police
powers, the Court has expressed limited willingness to uphold these
laws, even if they have some impact on immigration. "States," the
Supreme Court said, "do have some authority to act with respect to
illegal aliens, at least where such action mirrors federal objectives and
furthers a legitimate state goal."' 8 Even with these guidelines, it is still
very difficult to discern the legal boundaries of subfederal immigration
authority. Adding to the murky legal landscape is the 2002 federal
invitation to state and local police to enforce immigration laws. 19 This
federal invitation would seemingly clarify the legal situation by
removing preemption concerns (at least in the area of police
enforcement), but as applied, the federal-subfederal cooperation has
raised legal concerns of its own. 20  Finally, apart from federal
15 We provide only an overview of these legal issues. For more in-depth analysis, see the
articles referenced in note 3.
16 Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (upholding
the Chinese exclusion laws that prohibited Chinese laborers from entering the United States, even
in those cases where the laborers had left the country with official government permission to
return).
17 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378-89 (1971).
18 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982).
19 For more on this federal invitation, see supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
20 Concerned by reports that the Maricopa County Sheriffs Office in Arizona was violating
civil rights in its enforcement of immigration laws, Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE)
revoked its previous cooperation agreement that granted the department broader enforcement
powers. The current agreement limits the sheriffs department to jailhouse immigration
enforcement (for more on the different types of 287(g) agreements, see infra notes 45-48).
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constitutional concerns, these local government laws must also comply
with their respective states' laws as well.
This tangled legal thicket has ensnared many subfederal
immigration laws in litigation, with varying results. 21 For example,
laws enacted by Hazleton, Pennsylvania that barred the employment
and harboring of undocumented immigrants and required renters to
prove legal residency in order to obtain occupancy permits were struck
down on preemption grounds. 22 Valley Park, Missouri tried to enact
similar laws in 2007, but these laws were struck down in state court for,
among other things, violating the state's housing laws. 23 Because of
these legal challenges, the city eventually abandoned its renter law;
however, the most recent version of its employer sanction law was
upheld in federal court. 24
Results have also varied in litigation involving state immigration
laws. In 2010, the Tenth Circuit struck down employer sanction
provisions in the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act on
preemption grounds. 25 The Tenth Circuit held that Oklahoma's laws
penalizing employers who hire unauthorized workers and requiring
employers to verify the lawful immigration status of independent
contractors were preempted by federal laws. 26 But in 2009, the Ninth
Circuit upheld the Legal Arizona Workers Act, ruling that its employer
sanction provisions were not preempted by federal law.27 The Arizona
law authorizes state courts to suspend or revoke the business licenses of
employers who hire unauthorized workers and requires employers to
However, Sheriff Joe Arpaio is contesting the legality of this reduction, claiming that his
department has authority under state law to enforce immigration laws, even beyond the authority
delegated by the federal government. Nicholas Riccardi, Crusading Sheriff Takes on His Foes,
Critics ofJoe Arpaio's Immigration Tactics Have Now Become the Targets, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2009, at Al.
21 Laws that are the subject of litigation or that have been revoked are not considered in our
statistical analysis.
22 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 555 (M.D. Pa. 2007), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, No. 07-3531, 2010 WL 3504538 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2010); see also infra notes 62-
64 and accompanying text.
23 Reynolds v. City of Valley Park, No. 06-CC-3802, 2007 WL 857320 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Mar.
12, 2007).
24 The district court ruled that the employer sanction law was not preempted because it fell
into the licensing exception provided for by federal law. Gray v. City of Valley Park, No.
4:07CV00881, 2008 WL 294294 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008), aff'd, 567 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2009)
(upheld on jurisdictional grounds); see also infra note 64 and accompanying text.
25 Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 747 (10th Cir. 2010).
26 Specifically, the Oklahoma law provides that an employer who terminates a legally
authorized worker while retaining an unauthorized worker subjects itself to claims from the
terminated employee for back pay, reinstatement, and attorney's fees. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25,
§ 1313 (West 2009).
27 Ariz. Contractors Ass'n v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1048-49 (D. Ariz. 2008)
(rejecting a preemption challenge to the state's employer sanctions law), aff'd sub nom. Chicanos
Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 866 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom.
Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, 78 U.S.L.W. 3762 (U.S. June 28, 2010).
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participate in the federal E-Verify program, whereas federal law makes
such participation voluntary. 28  The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in this case and may provide some much-needed clarity on the
legal boundaries of subfederal immigration regulation.
B. Policy Significance
Even if the Supreme Court does address the legal questions, that
intervention is unlikely to resolve important questions in the policy
debate. The legal debate focuses, for the most part, on whether
subfederal governments have legal authority to enact immigration
legislation; assuming that some authority exists, the policy debate
focuses on whether subfederal governments should enact these laws.
Reflecting the larger immigration debate, there is little consensus about
what the goal of subfederal immigration laws should be. Advocates of
the laws believe that the goal should be to force undocumented
immigrants to leave the subfederal jurisdiction specifically or the United
States altogether. By enlisting the aid of subfederal jurisdictions and of
private parties like employers and landlords within those jurisdictions,
advocates argue that the laws multiply the enforcement and
effectiveness of federal immigration laws. Some undocumented
immigrants will be directly removed (e.g., those who are referred to
Immigration and Customs Enforcement through subfederal police
cooperation), but the majority of removals will be voluntary as
undocumented immigrants respond to the increased enforcement
pressure and "self-deport." 29 Among the laws' advocates are groups
and organizations that favor restrictive national immigration policies.30
On the other side, opponents of these laws argue that subfederal
governments should have no role in immigration enforcement. Not
surprisingly, among the laws' opponents are advocates for immigrants,
who are primarily interested in protecting the rights of immigrants and
in pushing for more liberal immigration policies. 31 They point to
studies that show increased racial and ethnic profiling when
immigration enforcement duties are placed in subfederal and private
hands as evidence that subfederal immigration laws are bad policy. 32
28 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-214 (2010).
29 See Kobach, supra note 4.
30 See, e.g., Encouraged Reverse Migration, supra note 4.
31 See, for example, the National Immigration Law Center, with a mission to "defend and
advance the rights and opportunities of low-income immigrants and their family members,"
arguing against the 287(g) program and other subfederal immigration law enforcement. NAT'L
IMMIGR. L. CENTER, http://nilc.org/index.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
32 See, e.g., Trevor Gardner III & Aarti Kohli, The C.A.P. Effect: Racial Profiling in the ICE
Criminal Alien Program, POL'Y BRIEF (The Chief Justice Earl Warren Inst. on Race, Ethnicity, &
2010] 493
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These advocates argue that the goal of subfederal governments should
be to protect the rights of all their residents, regardless of legal
immigration status.33
But the coalition of opponents also includes other, less obvious
parties whose interests focus on minimizing the negative effects of
subfederal immigration laws, not on liberalizing immigration policies
generally. For example, police departments across the country have
been reluctant to enforce immigration laws because this enforcement
would undermine their community policing programs in immigrant
communities. 34 Employers, business owners, and landlords have also
spoken out against subfederal immigration laws, because of the
potential negative economic effects. For example, a report requested by
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Home
Builders, and the National Roofing Contractors Association suggested
that states with restrictive immigration laws might expect to see more
workers leaving their jobs (both voluntarily and involuntarily), less
demand for goods and services typically sold to Latino communities,
and possible interruptions in business operations, both for companies
under investigation and for other companies doing business with the
investigated companies. 35
It is this last question of economic impact that we take up in this
Article. If the restrictive laws do have an economic effect on their
respective jurisdictions, we can hypothesize about the possible
manifestations of that effect. On the supply side, the laws might be
expected to decrease the availability of workers; by increasing
Diversity, Berkeley, CA), Sept. 2009, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/
policybrief irving_FINAL.pdf (finding that the discretionary arrests of Hispanics for petty
offenses rose dramatically after the Irving, Texas police department started cooperating with
federal immigration authorities and suggesting that the increased arrests resulted from racial
profiling, in order to screen the Hispanics for possible deportation).
33 See, e.g., Press Release, National Immigration Law Center, NILC Joins Calls for an End to
Controversial Program Allowing State and Local Police to Act as Immigration Agents (Aug. 27,
2009), http://nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/locallaw006.htm (arguing that local police
enforcement of immigration laws makes immigrants distrustful of police and increases dangers to
public safety).
34 See, e.g., Press Release, Houston Police Department, Major Cities Chiefs Statement on
Immigration (June 8, 2006), http://www.houstontx.gov/police/nr/2006/june/nr060806-1.htm
(expressing concern that local police enforcement of immigration laws undermines trust between
police and immigrant communities and thus threatens the success of community policing); see
also Scott H. Decker, Paul G. Lewis, Doris Marie Provine, & Monica W. Varsanyi, On the
Frontier of Local Law Enforcement: Local Police and Federal Immigration Law, in
IMMIGRATION, CRIME, AND JUSTICE 261-77 (William F. McDonald ed., 2009) (finding, based on
a national survey of municipal police chiefs, substantial differences in the way that local police
departments are approaching immigration law enforcement and attributing the differences to a
lack of clear policy guidance and models for enforcement).
35 PETER A. CRETICOS, ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE LAWS ADDRESSING




enforcement, the laws could make it more costly for undocumented
immigrants to stay in that particular jurisdiction. If this were to happen,
we would expect to see employment decrease and wages increase in the
restrictive jurisdictions. On the demand side, the laws might make it
more costly for employers to hire undocumented workers, either
because the employers themselves face penalties (as is the case with
employer sanction laws) or because there are more possible business
disruptions resulting from enforcement (e.g., losing employees who are
picked up by local police and deported). If this were to happen, we
would similarly expect to see lower employment, lower payroll, and
lower average wages.
We kept these and other possible economic effects in mind as we
analyzed the data. As the policy and legal debates continue, it is our
goal to provide empirical information about the economic effects of
subfederal immigration regulation. With this information, we hope that
decision makers in these debates, particularly the subfederal
governments that have enacted or are considering the enactment of these
laws, will make thoughtful policy decisions based on evidence, rather
than on conjecture about the laws' effects.
II. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
Our analysis uses two sets of data: a legal data set of restrictive
immigration laws enacted by cities and counties, and the CBP economic
data set compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau. The essence of our
analysis was to compare economic indicators in restrictive counties
against economic indicators in non-restrictive counties over time to
determine the economic impact of the restrictive laws. In compiling the
legal data set, we decided to focus on local immigration laws for several
reasons. First, this is a fascinating phenomenon that many have
observed, but no one has analyzed from an economic perspective.
Second, analyzing the effect of restrictive laws is easier at the local
level than at the state level. Because states implement many more
policies, 36 some of which are implemented contemporaneously with the
immigration laws, disentangling the effect of immigration laws is much
more difficult.
The presence of state immigration laws raises the question of
whether our analysis might be picking up the economic effect of state
laws, rather than of local laws. There are several factors that lessen this
possibility. First, because our analysis focuses on the 2005-2008 time
period, we would not see the economic effects of state laws that were
36 Examples include taxes, environmental laws, and insurance laws.
2010] 495
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
enacted either before or after that period. Second, our analysis is
structured so as to lessen the effect of any state immigration laws that
may have been enacted contemporaneously with local laws. As
explained in more detail in Part III, our analysis compares counties with
restrictive laws ("treatment counties") against counties without similar
laws ("control counties"); in one specific regression, we compare
treatment counties against geographically surrounding control counties
("border county regression"). 37  In these regressions, because the
control county group will include counties in the same state as the
treatment counties, the effects of any state immigration laws should be
experienced by both groups and thus netted out in the analysis.
A. Legal Data
We marked 2005 as the beginning year for our analysis because
this was the first year that local governments enacted restrictive
immigration laws in a noticeable volume. 38 We started with lists of
restrictive local governmental entities compiled by the American Civil
Liberties Union, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education
Fund, and the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (now
LatinoJustice PRLDEF). We combined these lists with DOJ
information about local governments that signed 287(g) agreements.
We also conducted our own searches using electronic news databases to
find other local governments that enacted restrictive immigration laws.
From these sources, we created a master list and then contacted each
local governmental entity to confirm that it had enacted the restrictive
law(s); wherever possible, we obtained a written copy of the law(s).
Once confirmed, the local governments were entered into our legal
database, with notations about the types of laws enacted, the year of
enactment, and the year of revocation, if any. Then the local
governmental entities were given Census Bureau county code identifiers
based on their geographical location. 39
In compiling our final list of restrictive jurisdictions, we recognize
that a law's enactment does not guarantee its enforcement, but we
believe that enactment is the correct dividing line for our analysis.
Simply stated, the impact that an immigration law may have on a
jurisdiction's economy can come from actual enforcement, but it can
37 The border county regressions are discussed infra note 87.
38 For more on the timing of these laws, see infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
39 If a governmental entity is located in more than one county (e.g., a city located in two
counties), then the entity was assigned the county code in which 50% or more of its population
resides, according to U.S. Census data. See City-County Finder, STATS IND.,
http://www.stats.indiana.eduluspr/alus profileframe.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2010) (giving
county and population information for cities and towns in the United States).
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also come from reputational effect as well. So, for example, a 287(g)
agreement may have an economic impact when undocumented
immigrants are arrested by local police and placed into removal
proceedings (and thus involuntarily separated from their jobs). But
even in the absence of rigorous enforcement, the agreement may still
have an economic effect if the local jurisdiction is perceived to be anti-
immigrant, and immigrants or immigrant-serving businesses avoid that
jurisdiction because of the perceived reputation.
Our study analyzed three types of laws: laws authorizing local
police to enforce federal immigration laws; laws requiring proof of legal
status to access benefits like employment or housing; and English-only
laws. 40 When we looked at the legislative efforts of local governments
to become involved in the immigration debate, these are the types of
laws that we saw over and over again. Of course, there are variations
among these laws, even among laws in the same category; yet the laws
share important characteristics that justify categorization. In the
following paragraphs, we seek to give an overview of these laws-their
general content, and some of the specific legal and policy issues that
have arisen in their implementation.
Before discussing specific categories of laws, it is helpful to have
some quantitative data on the laws. The laws that we studied were
enacted between 2005 and 2007,41 in different parts of the country. As
illustrated by Figure 1, there was an enormous spike in the enactment of
these laws in 2006, a trend that continued in 2007.42 But in 2008, the
40 Local governments have enacted other types of restrictive laws as well. For example, some
local jurisdictions have enacted anti-solicitation laws-laws that limit solicitation by workers or
employers. We do not include anti-solicitation laws in our analysis because these laws were
enacted, for the most part, before our period of study. See, e.g., Arturo Gonzales, Day Labor in
the Golden State, CAL. ECON. POL'Y (Pub. Policy Inst. of Cal., San Francisco, CA), July 2007,
available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/cep/EP 707AGEP.pdf (listing day laborer
ordinances that have been enacted in California, with only 3 of 54 enacted during the 2005-2007
period).
41 To give a more complete picture of the legal landscape, we include in Figures 1-3 laws that
were enacted in 2008, as well as laws that are the subject of litigation. In our statistical analysis,
we do not include 2008 laws because of the 18-month lag in the collection of economic data. See
infra notes 75, 77 and accompanying text. We also do not include laws under legal challenge
because they have not been enforced. See supra note 21.
42 The timing of local governmental interest in immigration laws roughly mirrors state
governmental interest. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, from 1999-
2004, there were approximately 50-100 immigration-related bills introduced by state legislatures.
E-mail from Ann Morse, Program Dir., Immigrant Policy Project, Nat'l Conference of State
Legislature, to Huyen Pham, Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan Univ. Sch. of Law (Aug. 12,
2009, 11:47 EST) (on file with author). In subsequent years, that number increased substantially:
2005 (300 bills introduced, 38 enacted, 6 vetoed), 2006 (570 bills introduced, 84 enacted, 6
vetoed), 2007 (1562 bills introduced, 240 enacted, 12 vetoed), 2008 (1305 bills introduced, 206
enacted, 3 vetoed), and 2009 (1500 bills introduced, 222 enacted, 20 vetoed). 2009 State Laws
Related to Immigrants and Immigration, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
default.aspx?tabid=19232 (last visited Oct. 28, 2010). The NCSL uses a broader definition of
immigration-related bills than we do, counting both bills that help immigrants (e.g., establishing
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number of enacted laws dropped 33%, from 55 to 37. With an
economic recession beginning in December 2007,43 one possible
explanation for this decrease is that local governments had to focus on
more pressing concerns like budget shortfalls.









2005 2006 2007 2008
The geographical location of these laws is also noteworthy (see
Figure 2). Conventional wisdom suggests that areas with large
immigrant communities, and large undocumented communities
specifically, would enact more restrictive laws. On that basis, it is not
surprising to find that California and Texas, border jurisdictions with
the largest undocumented populations, each have a sizeable number of
restrictive laws. But the geographical concentration of these laws
cannot be explained by undocumented population size alone. For
example, several east coast jurisdictions (Pennsylvania, North Carolina,
English as a Second Language programs), as well as bills that hurt immigrants (e.g., restricting
state benefits to those who can prove lawful presence). Still, that the timing and growth of local
and state governmental interest in immigration issues are similar reflects a growing sense that
immigration issues are appropriate for legislation at the subfederal level.
43 The National Bureau of Economic Research, a nonprofit economic research organization
based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, that is often cited for its research on business cycles, marks
this current economic recession as starting in December 2007. U.S. Business Cycle Expansions
and Contractions, NAT'L BUREAU ECON. REs., http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html (last
visited Oct. 28, 2010).
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and South Carolina) have high numbers of laws but relatively low
numbers of undocumented immigrants.44
Figure 2. Laws Enacted by Geographical Location
Finally, as illustrated by Figure 3, some categories of laws are
more popular than others. Police enforcement laws are by far the most
numerous; employment laws are a notable second, followed by
language and housing laws in decreasing numbers. Only a handful of
jurisdictions have enacted laws restricting government benefits based on
immigration status.
44 JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., A PORTRAIT OF
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES i-ii (2009) [hereinafter PEW
UNAUTHORIZED PORTRAIT], available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf (listing
undocumented population by state); see also S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Tom Wong,
Immigration Policies Go Local: The Varying Responses of Local Governments to Undocumented
Immigration (Nov. 9, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.1aw.berkeley.edul
files/RamakrishnanWongpapertinal.pdf (finding, in an empirical study, that Republican areas are
twice as likely to propose restrictive laws than Democratic areas).
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Police Employment Language Housing Benefits
1. Police Enforcement Laws
Though there are other federal programs that provide for local
police cooperation, we studied 287(g) agreements because they are the
most visible form of local involvement in immigration law enforcement
and because they actually transfer immigration enforcement authority to
state and local police departments. 45 Under agreements that have to be
approved by both local and federal authorities, local police officers have
direct access to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) databases
and are authorized to act in the place of ICE agents by processing non-
citizens for removal. Specifically, local police officers have authority to
prepare a notice to appear (that initiates removal proceedings in
immigration court) and to transport suspected non-citizens to ICE-
approved detention facilities for further processing. 46
45 For more information about other police cooperation programs, see Melissa Keaney & Joan
Friedland, Overview of the Key ICE ACCESS Programs: 287(g), the Criminal Alien Program,
and Secure Communities, NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR. (Nov. 2009), http://www.nilc.org/
immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/ice-access-2009-11-05.pdf.
46 U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 09-109, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:
BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT




When a local police department signs a Memorandum of
Agreement with ICE, the two sides agree about the type(s) of
immigration enforcement authority that the department will receive.
Under the jail enforcement model, local police only have authority to
screen for immigration status at local jails, when persons are arrested or
convicted of other crimes. Under the broader task force model, police
officers working on gang, drug, or other task forces are authorized to
screen the immigration status of any individual they arrest during the
course of their investigations. And some police departments operate
under a joint model, in which both types of authority are exercised
concurrently. 47 Before participating, designated officers must receive
ICE training and are subject to ICE supervision in their enforcement
duties; local police departments are responsible for paying the officers,
though the departments may apply for federal grants to pay some of
their 287(g)-related costs. 48
Though the general policy debate about subfederal immigration
laws has been discussed previously, 49 it is worth noting here the
controversy concerning 287(g) agreements specifically. More than any
other subfederal law, 287(g) agreements are lauded by advocates for
multiplying the enforcement power of federal immigration authorities.
ICE reports that since 2006, the 287(g) program has lead to the
identification of over 70,000 individuals who are suspected of being in
the country illegally.50 Congress has expressed its support for the
program by steadily increasing its funding: in 2007, the program
received $15.5 million in federal funds; in 2008, that amount increased
to $39.7 million; and in 2009, Congress provided $54.1 million in
federal funding.51
But critics charge that the 287(g) program provides cover for local
police departments to engage in racial and ethnic profiling. Though the
program promotes itself as targeting dangerous criminal aliens,5 2 critics
47 Id. at 8.
48 Id. at 9.
49 See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
so U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES: QUARTERLY REPORT
15 (2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/securecommunities/
congressionalstatusreportfy09 1 stquarter.pdf.
51 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 46, at 9.
52 The ICE website states:
The cross-designation between ICE and state and local patrol officers, detectives, in-
vestigators and correctional officers allows these local and state officers necessary re-
sources and latitude to pursue investigations relating to violent crimes, human smug-
gling, gang/organized crime activity, sexual-related offenses, narcotics smuggling and
money laundering. In addition, participating entities are eligible for increased re-
sources and support in more remote geographical locations.
Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration & Nationality Act,
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm
(last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
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argue that many of those arrested are arrested for minor offenses. For
example, in May 2008, 83% of immigrants arrested in Gaston County,
North Carolina under its 287(g) program were charged with traffic
violations. 53 The General Accountability Office also found that, in the
absence of clear federal controls, some jurisdictions were using their
287(g) authority to process individuals arrested for minor offenses such
as carrying an open container of alcohol or speeding. 54 When minor
offenses are used to trigger removal proceedings, the arrests appear
pretextual; instead of measures to control serious crime, the arrests look
like excuses to oust unwanted immigrants and to "enforce local
practices of racism and racial bigotry."55
2. Employment, Housing, and Other Benefit Laws
After police agreements, the most popular local immigration laws
are those regulating the distribution of benefits like employment and
housing. The laws prohibiting the employment of unauthorized workers
have taken different forms: Some jurisdictions require businesses
receiving government contracts to certify that they do not hire
unauthorized workers,5 6 while other jurisdictions require that
certification from all businesses as a prerequisite to receiving a business
license.57
The popularity of employment sanction laws reflects the
conventional wisdom that undocumented immigrants come to the
United States to work; if this is true, then restrictions on employment
should discourage undocumented immigrants from settling in the
United States (or at least in the specific jurisdiction with the
restriction).5 8 Whether the laws are having this effect is just not known,
based on current data. As we emphasize in Part III, our analysis of the
53 The Policies and Politics of Local Immigration Enforcement Laws: 287(g) Program in
North Carolina, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.C. LEGAL FOUND. & IMMIGRATION &
HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY CLINIC, UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, 29 (Feb. 2009),
http://www.law.unc.eduldocuments/clinicalprograms/287gpolicyreview.pdf
54 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 46, at 10-11.
55 Keaney & Friedland, supra note 45, at 2.
56 See, e.g., Sycamore Village, Ohio, Resolution 2007-40 (2007) (imposing financial
penalties on vendors who hire undocumented workers and authorizing the township to void those
contracts).
57 See, e.g., Payson, Ariz., Ordinance 709A (Apr. 5, 2007) (requiring all businesses to certify
that they do not hire undocumented workers; those who do face a license revocation and fines up
to $20,000).
58 One of the motivating factors for enacting federal employer sanctions was to decrease the
"pull" factor of higher-wage jobs that Congress believed was drawing undocumented immigrants
to the United States. See STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE AFFAIRS OF THE
S. CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102D CONG., OPTIONS FOR AN IMPROVED EMPLOYMENT
VERIFICATION SYSTEM (Comm. Print 1992).
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laws' effect does not track movement of individuals in and out of
jurisdictions; nor are we aware of any data that does so. It is worth
noting that the ability of federal employer sanctions to discourage
undocumented immigration has been severely criticized.59
The legal debate surrounding subfederal laws generally has been
discussed; 60 it is worth noting here that employer sanction laws are
particularly vulnerable to preemption challenges. Congress, in enacting
federal employer sanctions in 1986, expressly preempted most
subfederal regulation in the area: "The provisions of this section
preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions
(other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ,
or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens." 61 The
question then is whether particular local employer sanction laws fall
within the licensing exception.
On this preemption issue, we have seen mixed rulings. As
mentioned previously, the employer sanction law in Hazleton,
Pennsylvania that threatened to revoke an employer's business license if
the employer hired unauthorized workers was struck down. 62 Even this
narrowly crafted law, the federal district court held, was preempted by
federal law; because the revocation of a business license would force an
employer to go out of business, Congress could not have intended to
allow local jurisdictions to enforce this "ultimate sanction" while
barring them from imposing other sanctions. 63 On the other hand, the
employer sanction law enacted in Valley Park, Missouri, which also
threatened to revoke business licenses for the hiring of unauthorized
workers, was upheld by a federal district court. According to the court,
this law (which essentially operated in the same manner as the Hazleton
law) fell into the licensing exception allowed by Congress. 64
59 See, e.g., THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 1140 (5th ed. 2003) ("Whatever the goals
(and hopes) of the Congress that put the employer sanctions regime in place in 1986, the statutory
provisions have plainly failed of their purpose."); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: WEAKNESSES HINDER EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION AND
WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 21 (2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06895t.pdf (warning that "ongoing weaknesses" in the employer
sanction system undermine its effectiveness); Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of
Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777, 803-09 (2008) (describing the inability of federal employer
sanctions to deter illegal immigration because they are rarely enforced, difficult to prosecute, and
often circumvented with fraudulent documents).
60 See supra Part I.A.
61 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006).
62 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 519 (M.D. Pa. 2007), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, No. 07-3531, 2010 WL 3504538 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2010); see also supra note 22
and accompanying text.
63 Id.
64 Gray v. City of Valley Park, No. 4:07CV00881, 2008 WL 294294 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31,
2008). For more on the Valley Park litigation, see supra notes 23-24.
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The other private benefit that local governments have tried to
regulate in the immigration context is access to housing. The essence of
these laws is to try to limit rental housing to those with legal
immigration status. Although American communities have long used
housing restrictions to try to force out "undesirables," the housing laws
at issue here are noteworthy in that they link housing to immigration
status. In doing so, the laws brought the immigration debate to a new
front-access to housing, expanding the traditional discussions about
immigrant access to employment, education, and medical care. 65
Some laws have tied housing access directly to immigration status
by requiring landlords to verify the legal immigration status of tenants
before renting to them. These laws have received enormous amounts of
media attention and have also been ensnarled in lengthy litigation. For
example, Farmers Branch, Texas changed its housing ordinance three
times, in response to lawsuits; its most recent version, which required
tenants to prove legal immigration status in order to obtain mandatory
certificates of occupancy, was recently struck down on preemption
grounds. 66  Other jurisdictions, such as Valley Park, Missouri,
responded to litigation by dropping their verification laws entirely. 67
Currently, only seven of the thirteen verification laws that were initially
enacted are actually being enforced.
In addition to these high-profile verification laws, jurisdictions
have also enacted other laws that place indirect limits on immigrants'
access to housing. A handful of jurisdictions have enacted maximum
occupancy laws that limit the number of adults who can live in any
particular rental home. 68  Though these laws do not mention
immigration status explicitly, we included them in our analysis because
we found information linking the laws' enactment with concern about
undocumented immigrants (e.g., the law was enacted with other
restrictive immigration laws). 69
Finally, a handful of jurisdictions have limited access to their
government benefits based on immigration status. Unlike states, local
governments are not rushing to enact laws restricting the distribution of
65 See Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal
Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV 55 (2009) (arguing that
because of the special nature of housing, the federal government should intervene to prevent local
governments from restricting housing access based on immigration status).
66 Dianne Solis, Federal Judge Strikes Down Farmers Branch Ordinance Against Renting to
Illegal Immigrants, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 25, 2010, at Bl.
67 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
68 Acting on the assumption that immigrants, particularly undocumented immigrants, often
live together because of economic necessity, these laws seek to limit access to housing by
restricting the density of these living arrangements. Examples of maximum occupancy laws
include those enacted in Cobb County, Georgia, Cobb County, Ga., Ordinance 134-1 (2007), and
East Union, Pennsylvania, East Union, Pa., Ordinance 2008-7 (July 7, 2008).
69 See, e.g., Gaston, N.C., Resolution 2006-4 14 (Nov. 9 2006).
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their governmental benefits, in large part because cities and counties do
not exercise exclusive control over many types of benefits. In Prince
William County, Virginia, for example, the restricted benefits include
access to homeless assistance, substance abuse counseling, and
programs to assist the elderly (including in-home care). 70
3. English Language Laws
The third type of immigration law that local governments have
enacted are language laws that either establish English as the official
language 7' or require that all written government transactions be
conducted in English only. 72 Like the maximum occupancy laws, the
language laws do not directly mention immigrants or immigration.
However, we believe that they implicate immigration concerns for
several reasons. First, to the extent that the laws prohibit government
documents from being translated or government transactions from being
conducted in other languages, the laws will have an impact on the lives
of immigrants, many of whom do not speak English fluently. Second,
and more significantly, the laws send strong anti-immigrant messages.
Because those who are most likely to be affected by these laws are
immigrants from non-English speaking countries, the laws signal that
the enacting jurisdictions are hostile to immigrants and immigrant
concerns. 73 That anti-immigrant sentiment is particularly apparent
when the language laws are enacted together with other immigration
laws like housing and employment restrictions. 74
70 Kristen Mack, Immigration Initiative is Left Out of Budget: Chairman Says Funds Will Be
Found, WASH. PosT, Jan. 22, 2008, at B8; see also Prince William County, Va. Resolution 07-
894 (Oct. 16, 2007) (listing as Attachment services recommended for restriction based on
immigration status).
71 See, e.g., Dare County, N.C., Resolution 08-04-6 (Apr. 7, 2008).
72 See, e.g., Carpentersville Village, Ill., Resolution R07-84 (June 19, 2007).
73 Others have connected English-only laws with anti-immigrant sentiment. See, e.g.,
Richard Delgado, The Law of the Noose: A History of Latino Lynching, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 297, 307-08 (2009) (linking English-only laws and anti-bilingual education movements to
anti-immigrant fervor); Kevin R. Johnson, A Handicapped, Not "Sleeping, " Giant: The
Devastating Impact of the Initiative Process on Latinalo and Immigrant Communities, 96 CALIF.
L. REV. 1259, 1289-90 (2008) (arguing that English-only laws are a form of discrimination
against racial minorities and immigrants); Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration
Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619 (2008) (suggesting that English-only ordinances have been
used to broadcast local resistance to immigrants).
74 See, e.g., Gilberton, Pa., Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance 2006-7 (Aug. 24, 2006)




For our analysis, we used economic data from the Census Bureau's
CBP database. The CBP's data is collected annually from the nation's
employers and provides important information such as payroll size,
number of workers employed, and number of business establishments,
all broken down by industry and geographic location.75  So, for
example, we can find from the CBP data how many workers were
employed by the food services industry in DeKalb County, Illinois in
2006. The CBP is able to provide this high level of detail because much
of its information is provided directly through administrative data like
tax records, supplemented by surveys of employers.76 Thus, because it
does not depend solely on surveys, which can vary in response rates, the
CBP is considered a reliable source of data.
There are, however, some limitations to using CBP data. First, the
data is only available eighteen months after the end of the referenced
year, so this is the first meaningful opportunity to analyze the effect of
local immigration laws that were enacted between 2005 and 2007.77
Second, though the CBP data includes economic data for agricultural
support activities, it does not report data for crop production or
harvesting by hand. 78  According to the Pew Hispanic Center,
approximately 3.8% of undocumented immigrants work in the
agricultural, forestry, and mining industries. 79 Even without further
breakdown of the Pew statistic, we can safely conclude that a small
number of undocumented immigrants work in the unreported
agricultural sectors and are thus not included in CBP data. Finally, the
CBP data does not include undocumented immigrants who work for
cash and therefore do not show up in tax records. Various sources
estimate that 25 to 50% of undocumented workers belong to this
category.80  Still, even with these limitations, the CBP database
75 County Business Patterns: About the Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
econ/cbp/overview.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
76 County Business Patterns: Coverage and Methodology, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/methodology.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
77 County Business Patterns: About the Data, supra note 75.
78 The agricultural and forestry support industry (NAICS code 115) includes crop harvesting
by machine, soil preparation, plowing and fertilizing. North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS): Introduction, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics
(last visited Oct. 28, 2010). CBP data also excludes self-employed persons, employees of private
households, railroad employees, and most government employees. County Business Patterns,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/index.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
79 PEW UNAUTHORIZED PORTRAIT, supra note 44, at 34.
80 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS ON THE
BUDGETS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOvERNMENTS 6-7 (2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
[Vol. 32:2506
LOCAL IMMIGRATION REGULATION
provides important, detailed economic information that is the best
resource for our analysis.
C. Statistical Method
To measure the economic impact of local immigration laws, we
used a statistical method called difference-in-difference (DID)
estimation. The best way to understand how DID estimation works is to
consider alternative approaches. As an illustration, let's say that a
county enacted a restrictive law sometime between 2005 and 2007;
during this time period, we observe that employment has decreased in
that county (in Figure 4, the decrease from point A in 2005 to point B in
2007).






ftpdocs/87xx/doc8711/12-6-Immigration.pdf (citing different sources estimating that 25-50% of
undocumented immigrants pay income and payroll taxes); RANDY CAPPS, EVERETT HENDERSON,
JEFFERY S. PASSEL & MICHAEL FIX, CIVIC CONTRIBUTIONS: TAXES PAID BY IMMIGRANTS IN
THE WASHINGTON, DC, METROPOLITAN AREA 24 (2006), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411338_civiccontributions.pdf (estimating that 55% of
undocumented immigrants pay income and payroll taxes).
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We may be tempted to conclude that the law caused the decrease
(perhaps by raising labor costs and causing firms to reduce
employment), but as a matter of common sense, we know that macro-
trends (e.g., an economic recession) may also explain the decrease in
employment.
An alternative approach to measuring the effect of restrictive laws
is to compare employment figures of a restrictive county ("treatment
county") with those of a non-restrictive county ("control county") at the
same point in time. We might observe, for example, that in 2007,
employment in the treatment county is higher than in the control county
(in Figure 5, the vertical decrease from point B to point D).
Figure 5. Restrictive-Non Restrictive Comparison of Impact
Employment
County with Restrictive Laws ('Treatment" County)
B
&D
County without Restrictive Laws ("Control" County)
0 2005 2007 year
We might be tempted to attribute the different employment
numbers to the restrictive law, but again, common sense suggests that
the counties could have differing employment numbers for reasons
entirely independent of the law (e.g., different sized populations).
The DID estimation method enables us to evaluate the effect of the
restrictive laws by controlling for macro trends and for inherent
differences across counties. As illustrated in Figure 6 below, DID
508 [Vol. 32:2
LOCAL IMMIGRATION REGULATION
estimation introduces a control group (e.g., non-restrictive counties), 81
with the vertical difference between points A and C representing the
difference between the two groups of counties in 2005 and the vertical
difference between points D and B representing the same difference in
2007. Assuming that any macro shocks would affect all counties
equally,82 the difference in these two differences (BD-AC) captures A,
the effect of the restrictive law.
Figure 6. Difference-in-Difference (DID) Estimation of Impact
Employment
Coun -<thout Restrictive Laws CControl County)
0 2005 20(r year
The DID estimation is implemented by the following statistical
model:
Yet = ac + , + yRestrictct + ect
In this model, Yet denotes the economic variable we wish to evaluate
observed in county c in year t; ac represents the county fixed effects that
allow us to control for time-invariant differences across counties; Ai are
81 Depending on the exercise, the control group can be defined more narrowly (e.g., non-
restrictive counties geographically surrounding a restrictive county or high immigrant industries
in non-restrictive counties).
82 The simplifying assumption of equal effect is not true in reality, as recessions or booms
affect some counties more than others. But as long as the macro shocks do not affect the control
and treatment counties in a systematically different way, then the DID estimation will still be a
good estimation of the laws' effect. We also did this analysis for different industry subgroups,
see infra Part III.C; though recessions and booms affect different industries differently, the same
industry in different counties should be similarly affected by macro trends.
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the year fixed effects that allow us to control for macro trends that affect
all counties equally; Restrictc, is a dummy variable that equals 1 when a
county c has enacted a restrictive law in year t; and ec, represents
random differences across observations of the economic variable in
county c in year t. The coefficient y is the difference-in-difference
estimate of the effect of the restrictive laws on the economic variable
Yet.
In our analysis, we focused specifically on high-immigrant (HI)
industries-industries that have traditionally hired large numbers of
undocumented immigrants (between 11 and 28% of their workforce). 83
Our intuition was that if these laws do have an economic impact, that
impact would be felt in industries that rely, to a large degree, on
undocumented workers. We compared high immigrant industries in
restrictive counties with high immigrant industries in non-restrictive
counties, looking at the variables of employment, payroll, and number
of business establishments.
Implementing our statistical model, we ran three different sets of
regressions, with Ye, representing: employment in HI industries as a
percentage of county total employment; total payroll in HI industries as
a percentage of total county payroll; and the number of establishments
in HI industries as a percentage of the total number of establishments in
the county.
III. FINDINGS
A. Comparison with All Counties
In our initial set of regressions, we compared restrictive counties
against the control group of all counties. As illustrated by Table 1,84 the
estimated effect of the restrictive laws () on employment is -0.04. This
estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level.85 Our results also
83 PEW UNAUTHORIZED PORTRAIT, supra note 44, at 32. We matched industry descriptions
from the Pew Hispanic Center report to three-digit NAICS industry classifications for which data
are available in the County Business Patterns database. For more information on NAICS codes,
see North American Industry Classification System (NAICS): Introduction, supra note 78.
84 Table I gives the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates for the above DID
equation for all counties in the U.S. for years 2003-2007. OLS is a common method for
regression analysis, formally defined as "a computational method for regression analysis
calculating a line that minimizes the sum of the squares of the vertical distance between each
actual data point and its predicted value (that is, the point falling on the line)." ROBERT M.
LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 419
(2009). We include economic data from 2003-2004, before restrictive laws were enacted, in
order to measure the laws' effect.
85 Statistical significance refers to the probability that a result occurs by error or chance. So a
result that is statistically significant at 5% means that there is a 5% probability that the result
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show -0.026 effect on payroll, meaning that on average, the restrictive
laws reduced the payroll share of HI industries by 2.6%. And finally,
the estimated effect of the laws on the number of establishments is also
negative, but very small (-0.002). Neither of these last two estimated
effects is statistically significant.
These three results together suggest that restrictive laws have a
negative effect on economic activity. However, we have some reason to
be skeptical about the magnitude of the effects. Recall that with DID
estimation, the key assumptions are that macro trends (like an economic
recession) affect all counties in the sample equally (county invariant
macro trend) and that differences between counties do not change over
time (time invariant county differences). If these key assumptions do
not hold, these regressions may over or understate the effect of the
restrictive laws.
For example, suppose that restrictive counties tend to have more
construction activity than non-restrictive counties during the period of
study. Because the construction industry was one of the hardest hit
during this economic recession, restrictive counties would be differently
affected by a macro trend like the recession, violating the county
invariant macro assumption. Moreover, the differences in economic
variables between the two sets of counties would change over time,
violating the time invariant county differences assumption. More
specifically, in this hypothetical, the disproportionate effect of a
construction slow-down in the restrictive counties (that have more
construction) would contribute to A (the effect of the restrictive laws),
though the slow-down is unrelated to the laws' effect.
occurred by error or chance. See id. at 426 (defining statistical significance as "the occurrence of
a result that falls below the probability at which it is acceptable for a type I error (false positive)
to occur; stated differently, a result is statistically significant if the probability of its occurring,
referred to as the p-value, is less than a predetermined threshold, conventionally 5 percent").
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Table 1. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results for the
Sample with All U.S. Counties from 2003-2007
Establishments Employment Payroll
Restrictive County -0.002 -0.040*** -0.026
[0.002] [0.013] [0.017]
County Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Observations 15925 15648 15669
R-squared 0.95 0.648 0.691
NOTES: Each column is a separate regression. Independent variable names
are in the column header. Robust standard errors are in brackets.
* significant at 1%
B. Comparison with Similar Counties
To better support the DID assumptions of time-invariant county
differences and county invariant macro trends, we run regressions using
treatment and control counties that are not too fundamentally different
from each other. In the following analysis, we perform three variations
in our regressions.
Because the average restrictive county (average employment
220,000) is larger than the average non-restrictive county (average
employment 15,000),86 we re-run the analysis excluding control
counties with less than 1000 employees and then excluding control
counties with less than 10,000 employees ("no small county
regressions"). The exclusions enable us to choose control counties that
are more equal in size to the restrictive counties, which sharpens the
DID estimates.
Also, because geographically proximate counties tend to be
similarly affected by macro shocks, we re-run the analysis defining our
86 These are the authors' calculations, based on CBP data.
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control group as those non-restrictive counties that share a physical
border with restrictive counties ("border county regressions"). 87
Results from these three sets of regressions are shown in Table 2.
Qualitatively, these results are similar to the results achieved when
using all U.S. counties: Restrictive laws had a negative effect on
economic activity, but now the effects are smaller. The estimated effect
on employment is now between one and two percent; for the average
U.S. county, this translates to about 337 to 675 jobs (40 to 80 jobs for
the median county).88 The estimated effect on payroll is now between
0.8 to 1.9%; and the effect on the number of establishments is
negligible. For the no small county regressions, estimates of the effect
on establishments, employment, and payroll are now all statistically
significant.
87 By comparing restrictive counties with geographically proximate, non-restrictive counties,
these regressions are likely comparing restrictive counties with counties in the same states,
reducing the possibility that our analysis is picking up the economic effects of state, rather than
local, immigration laws.
88 According to CBP data, in 2007 average employment in all U.S. counties was about 33,000
(authors' calculation). Two percent of this number is 675.
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Table 2. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results for
Different Subsamples of U.S. Counties from 2003-2007
Compared with Border Counties
Establishments Employment Payroll
Restrictive County 0 -0.021 -0.019
[0.003] (0.013] [0.018]
County Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Observations 1755 1753 1753
R-squared 0.976 0.782 0.82
Compared with Counties with more than 1 000 Employees
Establishments Employment Payroll
Restrictive County -0.0O4*** -0.020*** -0.008*
[0.0011 [004] [0.004]
County Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Observations 12300 12289 12291
R-squared 0.958 0.752 0.791
Compared with Counties with more than 10,000 Employees
Establishments Employment Payroll
Restrictive County 4).004*** -0.010** -0.08**
[0.001] [0.0041 [0.004]
County Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Observations 5440 5437 5437
R-squared 0.949 0.794 0.829
NOTES: Each panel shows regression results with a different set of
control counties. Each column is a separate regression. Independent
variable names are in the column header. Robust standard errors are in
brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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C. Comparison Among Industries
Observing that the laws have an effect on high-immigrant
industries generally, we drill deeper to see how the laws affect
individual high-immigrant industries. In the following analysis, we
calculate the independent variables (Yet) as: employment in a specific HI
industry (e.g., Food Manufacturing or Construction of Buildings) as a
percentage of the county total employment; payroll of a specific HI
industry as a percentage of the county total payroll; and the number of
establishments in a specific HI industry as a percentage of total
establishments in the county.
Table 3 shows the results for these industry-specific regressions.
Among the high-immigrant industries, there are three discernible
groups. For the first group of industries, the laws had a negative but
small effect. The biggest decline as a result of the restrictive laws
occurred in the Food Services and Drinking Places industry (including
restaurants). The estimated effect on employment was a decline of
5.3%, and the estimated effect on payroll was a decline of 2.9%. Both
of these estimates are statistically significant. In Administrative and
Support Services, employment declined by 0.6% and payroll declined
by 0.7%. Construction of Buildings and Specialty Trade Construction
(including concrete and mason work) also experienced slightly smaller
declines in both employment and payroll.
For the second group of industries, the laws had no or negligibly
small effects. This group includes Merchant Wholesalers, Passenger
Ground Transport, Support Activities for Agriculture and Forestry, 89
Apparel Manufacturing, and Accommodation.
For the third group of industries, employment and payroll actually
increased as a result of the restrictive laws. Food and Beverage Stores
saw a 1.0% increase in both employment and payroll and a 0.1%
increase in establishments (all statistically significant at 1%). Food
Manufacturing, Repair and Maintenance, Personal and Laundry
Services, and Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction all saw small
increases in employment and payroll as a result of the laws.
These results are interesting for several reasons. First, it is worth
noting that HI industries are not uniformly affected by restrictive laws;
though they all traditionally hire large numbers of undocumented
workers, some industries are gaining employment (though the gain is
very small), while others are losing employment (again, the loss is also
89 As detailed in note 78, this industry includes crop harvesting by machine, soil preparation,




very small). 90 The gains and losses by different industries may explain
why the net employment effect on all HI industries is small. Second,
the results suggest the possibility of migrating workers. In addition to
the commonly offered hypothesis that the laws are causing workers to
move out of restrictive jurisdictions, these results add another possible
explanation: that workers are changing industries, rather than
jurisdictions.
Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results for
Individual High-Immigrant Industries from 2003-2007
Industry Name (NA1CS Code) Establishments Employment Payroll
Food Services and Drinking Places (722) 0.001 -0.053*** -0.029*
[0.001] [0.012] [0.017]
Administrative and Support Services (includes janitorial) (561) 4.001** 0.006* 4.007***
___________________ (0.001) [0.003] t0.002)
Construction: Specialty Trade Contractors (includes concrete, 0 -0.003* -0.004**
masonry)(238) [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Construction of Buildings (236) -0.001 4-01* 4.004***
(0.001) [0.001] (0.00]
Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods (423)
asegfGround Transport (includes tais and limousine
servias4 __ _ _
Support Activities for Agriculture and Forestry (115)
AppRd Manleturing (315)
Accommodation (721)
Food Mauacturing (3 11)
Repair and Maintenance (includes car repair and car washes)
(811)
Personal and Laundry Services (includes nail salons and dry
cleaners (812
Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction (includes highway
construction) (237)




















NOTES: Each pair of numbers denotes a separate regression. Independent vanable names are in the
column header. Robust standard errors are in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
90 Perhaps this differential effect can be explained by varying levels of enforcement within
different industries (that is, some industries may be more lax about verifying employees' lawful
work status than other industries) or varying enforcement from outside law enforcement (that is,
some industries-because of size, concentration, or social visibility-may be subject to more




Looking at the big picture, these results show that restrictive laws
have a negative but small effect on industries that traditionally hire large
numbers of undocumented workers. Specifically, these industries
experience a 1 to 2% decline in employment (translating to a loss of 337
to 675 jobs for the average county, 40 to 80 jobs for the median county),
because of the laws. These results are consistent with the supply-side
effect that we described earlier: By increasing enforcement and making
it more costly for undocumented immigrants to remain in restrictive
jurisdictions, the supply of workers has decreased, resulting in higher
labor costs and decreased employment.
Decreased employment is also consistent with a demand-side
effect, though with a twist. If restrictive laws are making it more costly
for employers to hire undocumented workers (either because the
employers themselves face penalties or because there are more possible
business disruptions resulting from enforcement), then we would expect
to see lower employment. However, our industry-specific analysis,
showing that some industries gained employment while others lost
employment, adds a twist to the conventional demand-side story. Our
results suggest that the laws have not increased employer costs
uniformly because some industries are actually gaining employment
(albeit small gains) as a result of the laws. The industry-specific
analysis also complicates the supply side picture: Instead of leaving the
restrictive jurisdiction altogether, this analysis suggests that workers
may simply be switching to other HI industries.
Finally, we emphasize that the employment decrease we find is
likely to include authorized, as well as unauthorized workers. Because
our economic data draws from tax records (among other sources), the
majority of workers on these payrolls, even in high immigrant
industries, are likely to be authorized. 91 Thus, the negative effects that
the restrictive laws have on employment, through the channels that we
described above, have likely spilled over into the market for authorized
workers. Moreover, higher labor costs could also force employers to
reduce hiring of authorized workers. Reduction in demand for goods
and services from unauthorized workers could also affect the
employment of authorized workers.




What is the economic impact of local immigration regulation?
This crucial question has been largely ignored in the highly-charged
debate about local immigration enforcement. To the extent that
economic impact has been discussed, those discussions have been based
on assumptions about the effects of the laws, not empirical analysis.
Our goal in this Article is to provide that empirical analysis as a
meaningful context for the policy debate.
Using difference-in-difference estimation, we found that the laws
have a negative but small effect on the economies of the jurisdictions
that enact them. Specifically, by running regressions that compare high
immigrant industries in restrictive counties to those in non-restrictive
counties over time, we found that the laws have a negative effect on
employment of 1 to 2%.
Yet the complexity of economic impact cannot be reduced to this
sound bite of analysis. In our study, we found that the laws affect
specific high-immigrant industries differently; while some industries
predictably lost employment as a result of the laws, other industries
gained employment. Perhaps more significant to the public debate are
the questions that economic analysis cannot answer: What is the
immigration status of those losing jobs? Are undocumented immigrants
leaving local jurisdictions (or the United States) as a result of the laws?
Reliable economic data does not track immigration status, and so
contrary to assumptions made by different sides in this debate, we
simply do not know the answers to these questions. Undocumented
immigrants are almost certainly among those losing jobs as a result of
the law, but authorized workers are also likely affected, a negative side-
effect of the laws. And unemployed workers may be leaving restrictive
jurisdictions for non-restrictive jurisdictions, but as our industry-
specific regressions suggest, they may also be switching from certain
high-immigrant industries to other high-immigrant industries.
Cities and counties considering the efficacy of local immigration
regulation must be able to base their decisions on information, not
assumptions. The economic impact of these laws (in its known and
unknown parameters) must be carefully weighed with other factors like
the monetary costs of enforcement and the effects on community
policing programs. With our study of economic impact, we hope to
jumpstart that local analysis.
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